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Abstract 
Ethic of responsibility and ethic of ultimate ends are most discussed Weberian concepts. The article 
reflects on their heuristic value in the present. A common interpretation claims that in a rationalized 
society the ethic of responsibility supplants or integrates the ethic of ultimate ends. The two ethics, 
however, fundamentally differ according to their relationship with the unforeseeable. Moreover, 
contrary to the idea of a relentless rationalization of society, the unforeseeable is today gaining 
relevance, even ceasing to be regarded as a problem. As a result, the ethic of ultimate ends expands its 
scope. The article dwells on major implications of this. The enduring relevance of Weber’s 
conceptualization, it is concluded, lies in its independence from the historical conditions in which it 
was formulated. 
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Introduction 
Despite their occasional character, the conferences on science and politics as a profession, or vocation, 
enjoy a prominent position in Max Weber’s production. They offer a synthesis and an accomplishment 
of key themes, from rationalization to science’s avalutativity, from the polytheism of values to the 
nature of politics. Among the many aspects on which the debate has focused a major place is held by 
the conceptual couple that constitutes the core of the conference on politics: Verantwortungsethik and 
Gesinnungsethik. The first term has always been translated as ‘ethic of responsibility’, while the second 
raises well-known difficulties of translation. In English (similarly to other languages) one finds it 
rendered with ‘intention’, ‘conviction’ and ‘ultimate ends’. In the following I will use the latter 
expression.  
According to a recent review article, two tendencies can be detected in contemporary literature on 
Weber. One seeks to ‘correct misunderstandings, clarify misconceptions and properly locate his work 
in the intellectual and social context within which he lived’; the other puts an emphasis on ‘applying, 
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adapting and using Weber’s concepts and ideas for understanding the contemporary world’ 
(Rosenberg, 2016: 297). The present paper belongs to the latter strand. Its aim is to show the enduring 
utility of the conceptual couple Weber developed in the conference. Such utility – this is my basic 
thesis – does not depend on the persistence of the world in which it was elaborated, but on its ability 
to show the distance that separates the present from that world. Said differently, the heuristic value of 
the concepts should be kept distinct from the epochal diagnosis and the contingent preoccupations 
underlying their formulation. Formulation which, of course, has also to be reconsidered – as 
Rosenberg remarks, by no means the ‘applicative’ approach to Weber can do without a proper 
understanding of his concepts and ideas. 
I proceed in four steps. I focus first on an interpretation of Weber according to which, in a rationalized 
society, the ethic of responsibility supplants or integrates the ethic of ultimate ends. I do not contend 
this is the only reading existing, nor in the space available can I properly demonstrate it is the 
dominant one. This interpretation, in any case, is hardly marginal, being a frequent encounter in the 
Weberian literature. Second, I show how the two ethics fundamentally differ according to their 
relationship with the unforeseeable. Third, I reflect on how, contrary to the idea of a relentless 
rationalization of society, the unforeseeable is today gaining relevance in a variety of fields, with 
ensuing expanding scope of the ethic of ultimate ends. Fourth, I argue that in a growing number of 
cases the unforeseeable even ceases to be regarded as a problem, being instead conceived as an 
opportunity. This further expands the role of the ethic of ultimate ends.  
As Rosenberg remarks, at the core of Weber’s methodological stance lies the validity of concepts (that 
is, their capacity to shed light on the phenomena under scrutiny) rather than their connection with 
‘worldviews’ (that is, encompassing accounts of modernity’s character and destiny). Accordingly, the 
conclusion stresses that the enduring significance of Weber’s conceptualization lies in its 
independence from the historical conditions in which it was formulated. 
 
The two ethics: a problematic relationship 
Let’s read Weber’s words: 
 
All ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably 
opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of 
responsibility.’ This is not to say that an ethic of ultimate ends is identical with irresponsibility, or that 
an ethic of responsibility is identical with unprincipled opportunism. Naturally nobody says that. 
However, there is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate 
ends – that is, in religious terms, 'The Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord' – and 
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conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account 
of the foreseeable results of one's action (Weber, 1946a: 120) 
 
A few lines later Weber adds that those who follow an ethic of ultimate ends do not feel responsible for 
the negative consequences of their actions, because they are not interested in a particular outcome but 
in keeping alive the flame of pure intentions. Their deeds are ‘quite irrational, judged in view of their 
possible success. They are acts that can and shall have only exemplary value’. On the contrary, those 
who act according to the ethic of responsibility ‘take account of precisely the average deficiencies of 
people’ (1946a: 121), hence they regard themselves as responsible for the undesired effects their 
action will produce, if these could have been foreseen.  
The distinction seems clear enough. Yet, things soon get more complicated. Weber adds that no ethics 
in the world (so also an ethic of ultimate ends) can dodge the problem of the relationship between 
ends and means, that is, the extent to which the attainment of good ends justifies the use of ethically 
dubious or dangerous means. Later he claims that the two ethics ‘are not absolute contrasts but rather 
supplements’ (1946a: 127). As we have seen, however, Weber talks also of an ‘abysmal contrast’ 
between the two conduct orientations, adding that ‘it is not possible to bring an ethic of ultimate ends 
and an ethic of responsibility under one roof or to decree ethically which end should justify which 
means’ (1946a: 122). The two ethics, therefore, seem to be both reciprocally implied and incompatible. 
This has troubled commentators. A characteristic ‘solution’ of the apparent contradiction is however 
easily discernible in the literature. I’ll provide a few examples. 
For Wolfgang Schluchter, one of Weber’s most prominent students, behind the oscillation between 
opposition and complementarity a fundamental divergence can be detected between the two ethical 
orientations (1979b: 87). Moreover, he argues, Weber’s argument holds only if one reads it as a 
devaluation of the ethic of ultimate ends, imposed by the recognition that, in a rationalized society, 
political decision has ‘to accept the restrictive conditions formulated by science’ (1979b: 86). For 
Schluchter, therefore, the conference gives a decisive prominence to the ethic of responsibility. 
Apparently different but eventually analogous is the route taken by those who, rather than claiming 
the incompatibility of the two ethics, make a case for their harmonization. To this purpose the 
isomorphism between the couple Verantwortungsethik/Gesinnungsethik and the couple 
Zweckrationalität/ Wertrationalität – a line of reasoning arguably inaugurated by Karl Löwith 
([1932]1993) – is often brought to the fore. For example, Rogers Brubaker (1984: 108-9) holds that 
those who adopt an ethic of ultimate ends apply value-rationality, whereas the ethic of responsibility 
does not merely apply means-ends rationality but addresses the problem of the relationship between 
ends and consequences of action, hence how acceptable are such consequences compared with the 
importance of the ends; importance that can be decided only on the basis of value criteria. In other 
words, the ethic of responsibility integrates the two types of rationality: value-rationality serves to 
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define the ends and weigh their relevance; instrumental rationality to specify, on such grounds, the 
means and the foreseeable consequences of action. Nicholas Gane (1997: 552) contests the idea of an 
integration of instrumental and value rationality. He maintains, however, that the ethic of 
responsibility is an ideal-type of Zweckrationalität, which precludes commitment to ultimate values 
yet is synthesised with the value-rationality of Gesinnungsethik. To my eyes, the difference between 
Brubaker’s account of ‘integration’ and Gane’s account of ‘synthesis’ is elusive. In both cases, anyway, 
the ethic of ultimate ends is subsumed to the ethic of responsibility, losing its key feature, namely the 
unconditional adhesion to a principle. Joshua Cherniss is most explicit in this regard: ‘Purposive 
rationality can guide decisions about what ends to pursue, […] recogniz[ing] potential conflicts 
between values and the need for trade-offs and choices between them’ (2016: 712). Nick O’Donovan 
similarly contends that ‘Weber’s conception of responsibility does impose constraints on a leader’s 
choice’ (2011: 90, emphasis original). Thus, it is not values that set the parameters for responsibility, 
but the other way round. Isher-Paul Sahni (2001) also aligns with this view, claiming that the 
subordination of the ethic of ultimate ends to the ethic of responsibility consists in the fact that the 
ultimate end of the politician has to be the recognition of responsibility.  
I could go on with other examples. To make it short, let’s say that, for a number of scholars across a 
significant time span (look at the publication dates of citations), the ethic of responsibility has primacy 
over the ethic of ultimate ends, the latter being either supplanted or integrated (and defused) in the 
former. Of course, we are talking of modern society, where means-ends rationality has taken a growing 
role and where politics has become an autonomous sphere of meaning, related but not confused with 
others, including morals and science. Such relationship is precisely what is in question in the 
conference.  
Weber’s account, however, seems to preclude such an easy solution. About the ethic of ultimate ends, 
as we have seen, he holds the apparently aporetic claim that its application is irrational from the 
viewpoint of the possible consequences, yet not insensitive to these. About the ethic of responsibility, 
Weber is concerned with distinguishing it from ‘power politics’, that is, the use of power for the sake of 
it, where the lack of a cause is often ‘identical with irresponsibility’ (1946a: 116). The presence of a 
goal external to the mere exercise of power prevents the acceptance of any means or the avoidance of 
any foreseeable negative consequence. As a result, one will find oneself ‘at some time in th[e] position 
[…] of saying “Here I stand; I can do no other”’ (1946a: 127).  
Thus, political ethics finds its space between power politics and fully irrational behaviour. ‘The final 
result of political action often, no, even regularly, stands in a completely inadequate and often even 
paradoxical relation to its original meaning. This is fundamental to all history, a point not to be proved 
in detail here. But because of this fact, the serving of a cause must not be absent if action is to have 
inner strength’ (1946a: 117). In this way, the ‘ethical irrationality of the world’ (1946a: 122), which 
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Weber stresses in other occasions1, embroils with the epistemic limits of instrumental rationality, also 
underscored various times.2 
Yet, if there is consideration of consequences in principled action and consideration of values in 
responsible behaviour, what is the purpose of a distinction that does not discriminate well even in the 
abstract? The answer has to consider that, in the text we are discussing, Weber dealt with the political 
profession, or vocation. Not, therefore, politics as a theory, but as a practice. Weber aimed to show 
how the political profession implies a daily confrontation with this discord; an awareness of the 
‘tragedy with which all action, but especially political action, is truly interwoven’ (1946a: 117). The 
two concepts, therefore, describe an apory, not the way to resolve it.3 
As we have seen, however, it is easy to detect in Weberian literature precisely this attempt: resolving 
the apory by giving primacy to the ethic of responsibility. This strategy reaches an extreme in the 
following argument. According to Weber, ‘the proponent of an ethic of absolute ends […] is a cosmic-
ethical “rationalist”’ (1946a: 122). In other words, this person believes in the rational order of 
existence, according to given principles. Then, it is claimed, this the one who applies a calculative 
rationality, rather than those who follow an ethic of responsibility. The latter, just because they 
acknowledge the ethical irrationality, hence the incalculability, of existence, are aware they have to 
hold on some ethical principle not further justifiable. In short, the actual ethic of ultimate ends is the 
ethic of responsibility (Satkunanandan, 2014).  
It is doubtful that such stretching of the notion of ‘calculation’ is correct. For Weber calculation is 
synonymous with instrumental rationality. Action, he says, ‘is instrumentally rational when the end, 
the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed’ (1978: 26), as 
with monetary calculation in economic action. This is precisely what the ‘cosmic-ethical rationalist’ 
does not do. The point is important for the argument I develop in the following section, yet counts here 
as additional evidence of the tendency to search for any possible argument in order to grant the ethic 
of responsibility primacy over the ethic of ultimate ends. Two are the main reasons for that, variedly 
stressed by Weber’s commentators. The first concerns the context of the conference; the second the 
overall coherence of Weber’s thought.  
The conference on politics has an explicit polemic purpose. In the aftermath of the World War, in a 
dramatic moment for Germany and Europe, Weber aims to warn the young university students against 
the dangers of political extremism, be it marked by an excess of idealism or an excess of realism, which 
is often an inversion of the former. From this stems the hostility of the text for those who refuse 
responsibility by appealing to principles, be these the utopian pacifist or the syndicalist protesting 
against social injustice; a refusal that puts them on a par with the soulless realism of the bureaucrat 
who applies the rules, or the politician that aims at power for the sake of it.  
The pre-eminence of the ethic of responsibility seems also consistent with Weber’s epochal diagnosis: 
rationalization as a relentless process thanks to the higher organizational efficiency and operational 
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effectiveness of means-ends rationality, compared with any other logic of action. If he concludes The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 2001) with a note of caution, remarking that the 
‘iron cage’ is not necessarily the final destination of modernity, modern political ethics can hardly 
disregard the availability of increasingly robust knowledge and means of intervention. The role of 
science in this process is especially stressed. I have already mentioned Schluchter, yet comparable 
arguments about the centrality of science for political action can be found in Brubaker, Gane and 
others (for example Scaff, 1989). Another example is O’Donovan (2011). He claims that the ethic of 
responsibility, before purposive rationality (which the bureaucrat and the power politician also 
apply), is a matter of responsibility-taking for actual outcomes – beyond foreseen ones yet within the 
limits of foreseeable ones, as clarified by scientific inquiry.  
Underlying this view is a conventional understanding of science as the social institution presiding over 
the production of reliable knowledge, based on objective measurement and expressed in prediction. 
Such view is consistent with the liberal tradition,4 as synthesized in Aaron Wildavsky’s (1979) well-
known expression, that ‘science speaks truth to power’. Science, more precisely, is assumed to 
strengthen the efficacy of government action, depersonalizing decision and linking its legitimacy to the 
credibility of the observation of facts (Ezrahi, 1990). This assumption, however, has progressively 
narrowed its scope. Post-war narratives of a smooth matching between political demands and 
technical responses (Bush, 1945) have been superseded by the acknowledgment that political choice 
follows criteria of opportunity, beyond and before technical efficiency (Pellizzoni, 2009). More 
recently, the idea has gained momentum that politics and industry are entitled to directly set the lines 
of research, in so doing circumscribing from the outset the ‘facts’ to be observed.5  
Applying the Weberian categories to the present means tackling the way science works and relates 
with politics and business, as well as other institutional and cultural changes. In this regard, I contend, 
it means tackling first of all the way the unforeseeable affects behaviour in a variety of fields. To 
address this point we have to start with reflecting on the role the unforeseeable plays in the two ethics.  
 
The two ethics and the unforeseeable 
The ethic of responsibility applies to the foreseeable consequences of action, Weber says. What is 
known, therefore, is regarded as adequate to taking reliable decisions – taking ‘risks’ in the proper 
sense of making probability estimates. Those who follow an ethic of ultimate ends, instead, give their 
action an ‘exemplary value’. What does this mean? It cannot be a strategy for inducing impulsive 
imitation, otherwise we would have on one side (agent) instrumental rationality, on the other 
(imitator) irrationality. Exemplarity, instead, corresponds to Weber’s definition of value-rational 
action, as an action carried out ‘for its own sake’ in reply to ‘“commands” or “demands” which, in the 
actor’s opinion, are binding on him’ (1978: 25). ‘Exemplary prophets’ like the Buddha, ‘who, by his 
personal example, demonstrates to others the way to religious salvation’ (1978: 447), are a case in 
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point. And ‘the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to [a] value for its own sake, […] the 
less is he influenced by consideration of the consequences of his action’ (1978: 26) – hence, in the 
conference, the reference to the maxim ‘The Christian does rightly and leaves the result with the Lord’.  
So, choosing an ethic of ultimate ends seems to entail complete disregard for consequences. Yet, for 
Weber, ‘rationality’ always means orientation to the control of the world through information 
processing (Schluchter, 1979a: 14). How, then, can exemplary action be regarded as rational, rather 
than affectual or traditional? How can one ‘consistently plan […] its detailed course’ (Weber, 1978: 25) 
without falling into magic ritualism? The reply is: because the actor is a ‘cosmic-ethical rationalist’: 
s/he believes in an other- or this-worldly ethical order. The second case includes the syndicalist and 
the pacifist, but also the manifold invocations of natural law legitimating revolt against existing rule 
without appealing to religious norms or revelation (1978: 867). This case, which secularization makes 
increasingly relevant, is however problematic to account for in terms of disregard for consequences. 
The assumption is that an ethical order is immanent to this world, and it can be established or restored 
despite the latter’s current irrationality. Yet, if such order could be affirmed by applying consequential 
reasoning, the actor would take this route (the ethical agent, qua rational agent, cannot dodge the 
problem of the relationship between means and ends, Weber says) and the ethic of ultimate ends 
would be integrated in the ethic of responsibility. Carrying out action ‘for its own sake’, then, means 
that such order, while grasped, remains inaccessible through such reasoning. In this case following the 
principle is the only rational way to proceed. Indeed, even an apparently pointless testimony may 
contribute, through unknown pathways, to the actualization of the ‘right’ state of the world. 
In short, at least when other-worldly considerations are ruled out,6 disregarding available information 
when planning action would amount, in Weber’s own terms, to irrational behaviour. Exemplary action, 
therefore, makes sense when such information is unavailable (now and possibly ever). Weber’s claim 
that the more one adheres to a principle the less is s/he concerned with consequences has to be read 
the other way round: the less the consideration of consequences makes sense (because they cannot be 
reliably assessed), the more a principle may give a clue to how one is to act.7 
It is interesting to note that, in the period in which Weber writes his conference, the problem of 
uncertainty is coming to the forefront of the social sciences. This problem differs from the long-
debated question of method, to which Weber had also contributed. The issue is not the lack of mono-
causal explanations of historical and social processes,8 but the limits of probabilistic reasoning. The 
development of statistics had offered a possibility of control of situations where, either for the 
cognitive limits of the actor or for the indeterministic character of phenomena, the causal chain of 
events is not univocally determinable. The limits of probabilistic prediction begin to be conceptualized 
with Keynes’s (1921) concept of ‘personal probabilities’ and Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk 
and uncertainty. In both cases the reference is to situations where, in the impossibility of probabilistic 
quantification, economic decisions have to turn to personal heuristics. This, however, does not mean 
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that the actor has to be considered irrational. Rather, the ultimate end (profit) is pursued by relying 
not only on calculative rationality but also, and sometimes to a decisive extent, on normative 
assumptions concerning the situation and its possible developments. 
The theme of rational decision under uncertainty has continued to be debated. Consider, for example, 
a recent assessment of the sociologist Jens Beckert. Starting from the classic model of rational choice 
he distinguishes two situations. In the first, the actor intentionally departs from maximizing the 
outcomes. This has nothing to do with uncertainty, but with the actor’s purposes. A second situation is 
when the actor departs unintentionally from the maximization of outcomes. This happens when ‘the 
complexity of the situation and/or the limited cognitive capacities of information processing’ prevents 
the actor from ‘know[ing] unambiguously which means [to] use to achieve this goal’ (2002: 43). In this 
case normative orientations – Beckert talks of ‘fictional expectations’, defined as ‘present imaginaries 
of future situations’ (2013: 222) – intervene to support the choice of the actor, who otherwise would 
be blocked by an insuperable uncertainty.  
As Keynes and Knight before him, therefore, Beckert argues that in situations where no reliable 
calculations are possible normative orientations guide decisions. On this ground the ethic of ultimate 
ends is not a relic of premodern societies, but an ever present option faced with crucial limits to 
predictive capacities. By the same token, no synthesis or integration between the two ethics is 
possible, unless ultimate ends are reduced to something else, namely conditional value commitments 
(we have seen this is what Weber’s commentators do). 
 
The growing role of the unforeseeable  
Rationalization means expanding cognitive and operational capacities. In this framework there are 
good reasons for arguing that the ethic of responsibility replaces or (in a defused form) integrates the 
ethic of ultimate ends. Weber’s limitation of responsibility to foreseeable consequences, a scholar 
contends, may be actually due to the acknowledgment that, with rationalization, they take growing 
relevance, while the role of ‘the genuinely unforeseeable is quite limited’ (Satkunanandan, 2014: 174).  
This, of course, does not mean that such role is irrelevant. In modern legislation the unforeseeable acts 
as an exonerating clause from responsibility. Think of liability for defective products. If a defect falls 
within a threshold of ‘normality’, that is, statistical predictability, then liability applies, even without 
the need to demonstrate the producer’s negligence (so-called ‘strict liability’). If the defect is unusual, 
that is unforeseeable, the exonerating clause applies. This is especially relevant to a society 
organizationally complex and pivoting on innovation. The unforeseeable effects of the latter, it is 
argued, cannot be imputed to innovators, if one is not to discourage progress (see for example 
European Commission, 1999). As a result, so-called ‘development costs’ are offloaded onto individuals 
and groups that are supposed to benefit from innovation.9  
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Yet, as Ulrich Beck (1992) has noticed, today the scope of technology has broadened and its complexity 
increased to the point that a growing number of its effects may be claimed to be unforeseeable. The 
result is what he calls ‘organized irresponsibility’ – a systematic exoneration from liability. To address 
this issue one finds little help in the Weberian literature on the two ethics. Also O’Donovan, who 
extends responsibility for decisions beyond their ‘apparent rationality at the time they were taken’ 
(2011: 99), finds unconceivable an extension beyond the threshold of the foreseeable.  
Consider, then, what can be seen as a (weakly) institutionalized reply to organized irresponsibility: the 
precautionary principle. The idea is that the lack of conclusive data about potential threats cannot lead 
to postpone measures capable of preventing major or irreversible damages to the environment, health 
or the physical and psychical integrity of people. Entering soft and hard regulation between the 1980s 
and 1990s, precaution can be seen as an operational translation of Hans Jonas’s (1985) ‘imperative of 
responsibility’.10 However, if reliable data are missing, then normative assumptions play a far greater 
role than in preventive action, for example in deciding about the seriousness of the threat or the 
proportionality of interventions. This is no surprise: as we have seen, the deeper the uncertainty, the 
strongest the role of value commitments. However, one may ask whether and to what extent liability 
for undesired consequences applies to this type of situation. In this regard a contribution of the 
philosopher Iris Marion Young can be relevant. 
For Young the ‘liability model’ of responsibility looks backward, requiring to reconstruct the causal 
chain that links an event to preceding ones and the implied actors. Yet, Young asks, what happens with 
‘structural injustices’, that is ‘social processes that put persons under a systematic threat of 
domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as 
these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and 
exercising their capacities’ (2006: 114)? Structural injustices concern the distribution of material and 
symbolic resources and often depend on extended and loose social connections, which make it hard to 
identify specific liabilities. Let’s think for example of global trade. Consumers can hardly be held liable 
for worker exploitation or hazardous emissions occurring somewhere in the world, along intricate 
production chains. For Young, however, since they play their own role in the cooperative scheme 
enabling exploitation and hazard production, they should acknowledge and take up their part of 
responsibility. Yet, what can one do? How is one to behave? Given the opacity of the causal chain the 
answer cannot lie in a search for efficient, effective and predictable courses of action, but rather in 
‘carrying out activities in a morally appropriate way and aiming for certain outcomes’ (2006: 119). In 
other words, if a detailed reconstruction of causal chains is impossible or extremely onerous, one has 
to base action on one’s own commitment to a certain outcome. 
Young’s forward-looking account of responsibility bears close affinity with an ethic of ultimate ends. 
Consumers that, for example, refuse to buy from sweatshops apply the logic of exemplarity discussed 
above. They assume that, if they act in a certain way, the desired outcome will in the end be achieved. 
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This expectation is not irrational, but neither is it means-ends rational, in the sense of based on 
foreseeable effects. This even in the case of vast mobilizations: a successful boycott campaign may lead 
to a stop of production and workers’ termination, rather than improved work conditions. One may 
object that this falls within Weber’s remark about the distance between original meaning and final 
result of political action as a reason for grounding it on principled reasons. Yet, one thing is to 
acknowledge this without giving up the attempt to identify the foreseeable consequences of action; 
another is to acknowledge that such an attempt is a lost cause. 
The spread of ‘ethical’ consumerism (Micheletti, 2003) shows how globalization and the ensuing 
increase in social complexity imply growing recourse to the ethic of ultimate ends. The same happens 
with precaution, to the extent that the growing scope of technology entails growing limits to the 
prediction of its effects – there is indeed a connection between pretences of manipulating the world 
and saliency of the unknown (Wynne, 1992). Late modernity, in short, seems a different place to the 
one Weber envisaged. Instead of a growing disconnect between increasingly powerful means and the 
ends they are set to achieve, value commitments seem to impinge ever more on the very conception 
and selection of means.  
 
Loving the unforeseeable  
In the Weberian literature the unforeseeable has a negative stigma: it hampers rational action. This 
happens also with precaution and Young’s forward-looking responsibility. However, an opposed vision 
has gained momentum, whereby the unforeseeable ceases to be a problem and may even become an 
opportunity. As a result, the scope for the ethic of ultimate ends broadens further, compared with the 
examples already discussed.  
The turning point is arguably the 1970s. In these years new descriptive and applicative regards on the 
biophysical and social world begin to appear. One example is the ‘ecology of chaos’ or ‘disorder’ 
(Holling, 1973; Worster, 1990). New accounts of ecosystems depart from traditional ones in that they 
find in nature no spontaneous tendency to equilibrium: no progressive biomass stabilization; no 
diversification of species or movement towards greater cohesiveness in plant and animal 
communities. Change goes on forever, it is claimed, with no direction or tendency to stability; no 
cooperation, consistence and holistic organization but rather competition, patchiness, fragmentation. 
Similarly, in chemistry and physics, attention increasingly focuses on ‘dissipative structures’, that is, 
thermodynamically open systems that work in a far-from-equilibrium condition and are characterized 
by the spontaneous formation of dissymmetry and bifurcations, which produce complex, sometimes 
chaotic, structures (Prigogine and Stengers, 1979). In cybernetics, the homeostasis theorized by 
Wiener and von Neumann is first replaced by the notion of  ‘autopoietic systems’, with their feedback 
loops, then by the idea of systemic emergence, as underlying research on artificial intelligence (Hayles, 
1999).  
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These and other perspectives that have enjoyed growing success, therefore, convey an account of the 
material world as inherently turbulent and unstable, claiming it is precisely this feature what gives it 
vitality and dynamism. The policy implications of this account are easy to draw. If stability is the 
exception rather than the rule, then predictive knowledge based on individuation of regularities loses 
much of its relevance and appeal. Already in 1972 the nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg talked of 
‘trans-science’ to express the idea that, in a growing number of cases, classic experimental procedures 
are impossible to follow. There is no way to prove, for example, that repositories of radioactive waste 
can stand for hundreds or thousands of years any perturbing event, geological or human (wars, loss of 
historical memory etc.). Their design and management, therefore, cannot be else than a ‘real world’ 
experiment (Krohn and Weyer, 1994), in which each and everyone is involved and the outcomes of 
which are properly unforeseeable. Similarly, the ecological impacts of agricultural gene technologies 
cannot be properly assessed via classic experimental procedures. These are fit for detecting the 
capacity of genetic modifications to fulfil specific goals (crop resistance to adverse climatic conditions 
or massive use of pesticides; features of fruits such as size, taste and resistance to rotting, etc.) but not 
for addressing the complex interactions with other organisms occurring in the open environment. 
Again, what is happening is a real world experiment, in the sense specified above.11 
This would be unacceptable according to an ethic of responsibility, yet may make sense in terms of 
ultimate ends. According to the presently much trumpeted notion of ‘research integrity’, the 
‘responsible conduct’ of research builds on values such as accuracy and objectivity, which work as 
criteria for gauging misconduct (Steneck, 2007). Yet, when the unforeseeable plays a crucial role, 
accuracy and objectivity become, much like Young’s ethical consumerism, a matter of aims more than 
actual performances. For example, if sterility of genetically modified crops extended to non-modified 
ones, or (as it seems actually happening) super-resistant pests developed as a result of massive use of 
pesticides with modified crops, this could hardly be stigmatized as lack of accuracy or objectivity as 
long as sound experimental procedures were applied providing no evidence of problems, in a 
justificatory framework of alleged major goals (‘answer to world hunger’ is a favourite trope). 
These examples show how the scope of the ethic of ultimate ends is increasingly broadening – and 
with it the category of ‘development costs’. Yet, the unforeseeable is still depicted here in negative 
terms. A further step, then, is conceiving of the unforeseeable as an opportunity. Again, gene 
technologies offer an example. Systems biology is described as ‘an attempt to make sense of the vast 
amounts of data that have been generated by genome-sequencing projects and other molecular data-
generating exercises’ (Calvert and Fujimura, 2009: S46) through application of algorithms, software 
and mathematical models. Systems biology, moreover, is but one example of the burgeoning 
application of data mining and processing to generate unforeseen and unforeseeable insights (another 
major field is security: see Amoore, 2009). Another declension of the ‘positive’ regard on the 
unforeseeable comes from geoengineering. ‘Solar radiation management’ techniques have been 
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proposed for reducing the greenhouse effect. The idea is of reflecting solar radiation through 
launching giant mirrors into space, spraying sulphates into the stratosphere and so on. Given the 
chaotic character of the atmosphere, however, it is impossible to predict the actual effect, either local 
or global, of such applications (Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013). Their rationale, therefore, cannot 
build on a traditional notion of control, but rather on the possibility of reacting and adjusting on the 
spot, moment by moment, to the swerves of the system. The assumption, in other words, is that it is 
better to ‘incite’ turbulence rather than wait for its ‘unsolicited’ manifestation (security, again, offers 
other examples: see Massumi, 2007). The logic of financial derivatives is similar. One wagers on the 
variability of an attribute of a given asset (commodity, money, shares etc.), and the prospect for profit 
grows with the increase in the uncertainty of the performance of such attribute (Bryan and Rafferty, 
2014), as amplified by speculation itself. Again, the goal is, so to say, to ‘ride’ unpredictability.  
For Holling stability means sclerosis and decline, both in nature and for society. Hence one is to 
‘embrace uncertainty and unpredictability’ (2001: 391). This standpoint is in tune with ‘an extensive 
and immensely influential managerial literature appearing since the early 1980s […] [which] 
celebrates uncertainty as the technique of entrepreneurial creativity, […] the fluid art of the possible’ 
(O’Malley, 2004: 3). From this perspective, uncertainty enhances danger and insecurity but is also ‘at 
the heart of what is positive and constructive’ (O‘Malley, 2010: 502).  Turning upside-down Keynes’s 
and Knight’s perspective, proper calculations of risk become the exception, while reasoned bets over 
unpredictable futures become the rule. What is required is not so much a capacity of calculation, as 
intuition, foresight, flexibility, experiential judgment, rules of thumb. A recent take on this theme is the 
case for ‘antifragility’. According to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, systems based on knowledge, control and 
predictability are fragile. The task is to stand randomness, uncertainty, volatility and errors, 
benefitting from indeterminacy and disorder. To this purpose one has to rely on non-predictive 
decision making, which allows ‘to deal with the unknown, to do things without understanding them – 
and to do them well’, since ‘we are largely better at doing than we are at thinking’ (2012: 4). 
We should love unknown unknowns, says lyrically Taleb. One may ask where this love for the 
unforeseeable comes from, being completely at odds with modern rationalization. I cannot attempt a 
comprehensive reply here. However, it is good to note that the 1970s, when new accounts of reality 
begin to develop, are the years of stagflation, energy crisis, mounting environmental threats and 
protest movements, but also of the emersion of the post-Fordist industrial model and the beginning of 
the ‘neoliberal revolution’ (Hall, 2011). According to various authors, then, theories of complexity and 
non-equilibrium, which contained also a libertarian critique of  Fordist industrialism and ‘command-
and-control’ regulation, provided a capitalism in crisis with a framework for redirecting socio-
ecological instability towards a new regime of accumulation (Walker and Cooper, 2011; Nelson, 2014). 
This claim, which builds on the idea of a ‘counter-revolutionary’ use of notions and demands, such as 
those coming from protest movements, born with opposite intentions (Virno, 1996; Boltanski and 
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Chiapello, 2005), may look, and perhaps is, an oversimplification, not least for the fact that the 
‘neoliberal revolution’ is anything but a consistent process (Brenner et al., 2010). And yet, some tenets 
of neoliberal theories have become ubiquitous and almost unquestionable, beginning with the idea of 
crucial limits to prediction and planning faced with social complexity.12 
Of course, in stressing the growing role of the unforeseeable and the ethic of ultimate ends in present 
society I am describing a trend, not a generalized situation. For example, synthetic biology works 
according to a different rationale, compared with systems biology. It adopts a mechanistic conception 
of the living, imagined as an assembly of parts to be identified, disassembled and reassembled 
according to purpose. Such broadening room for means-ends rationality should entail a broadening 
room for the ethic of responsibility. And yet, as noted, with the growth of the capacities of 
manipulation of materiality, the relevance also grows of the unknown. As a consequence, organized 
irresponsibility is likely to take growing relevance also in this field, with the innovators’ aims 
increasingly invoked as a justification for undesired outcomes (such as diffusion of crop sterility or 
super-resistant pests). In other words, the ethic of ultimate ends may expand also where the ethic of 
responsibility should find an elective terrain of application. 
A clue that this is not an unfounded supposition comes from the recent concept and policy framework 
of ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRI). RRI is described as ‘a transparent, interactive process 
by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the 
(ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its 
marketable products’ (von Schomberg, 2013: 63). The idea, not new, is to shape innovation before 
technological ‘lock-in’ sets in. Novelty lies rather in the proactivity of the approach (the emphasis is on 
innovation rather than risk) and in the opening of inquiry to ‘purpose’ questions (rationale, 
distributive effects, alternatives etc.). RRI seems therefore to strongly foster an ethic of responsibility 
vis-à-vis innovation. However, from this perspective, its major strength – developing and introducing 
innovation in society in a collaborative manner – is also its main weakness. In situations of huge 
difference in agency (big corporations or research centres on one side, fragmented groups of end users 
or consumer ‘representative’ organizations on the other), the ‘mutual responsiveness’ of innovators 
and stakeholders is likely to result in a major disclaimer – we shared the choice, we share the blame. 
In other words, it is not difficult to anticipate that RRI is going to legitimise the predominance of the 
ethic of ultimate ends over the ethic of responsibility much more than it happens with traditional 
exonerating clauses. This is actually said in plain words in related literature: ‘Burdened with imperfect 
foresight, we take a chance, hoping to be excused from moral blame [let alone legal liability, my 
adding] if it can be demonstrated we did not have sufficient knowledge of the future consequences of 
actions at the time: that these could not have been “reasonably foreseen”’ (Owen et al., 2013: 28). 
 
Conclusion  
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In this paper I have argued that the complex relationship between ethical orientations Weber portrays 
in his conference resists the interpretation one frequently meets in the critical literature, according to 
which the ethic of responsibility would have supplanted or integrated the ethic of ultimate ends. This 
interpretation may be consistent with Weber’s contingent purposes and epochal diagnosis, yet 
downplays how the two ethics imply an opposed relationship with the unforeseeable, which for the 
one represents a hampering condition, for the other an enabling one. The unforeseeable, moreover, 
has hardly lost relevance. On the contrary, it has been gaining significance, undermining the claim 
about the growing dominance of means-ends rationality. The Weberian categories prove invaluable 
precisely because they can be applied without subscribing to such claim. In fact, not only has the 
unforeseeable taken a growing role in human affairs, but such role is undergoing an evaluative 
inversion, being increasingly conceived as an opportunity rather than a problem.  
As a result, the ethic of ultimate ends expands its scope. This, however, does not correspond to a 
return to pre-modern views. In a world where the belief in a cosmic-ethical order plays a lessening 
role, the unforeseeable rather becomes an exonerating clause of growing power. Said differently, 
claiming one’s good will may authorize and justify any sort of behaviour. It is certainly possible, as 
Young’s ‘ethical’ consumer does, to broaden or deepen one’s sense of obligation towards humans and 
nonhumans, with ensuing restraint in the pursuit of one’s own goals. Yet it is possible also to proceed, 
with lessening moral, political and legal burdens, with a self-interested and dominative attitude. This is 
what one detects in a variety of fields, from innovation to finance, from the environment to security, 
where the unforeseeable is even elicited to be instrumentalized to given purposes. In short, the appeal 
to ultimate ends seems in many cases to legitimize an enhanced version of the modern expansive 
hubris – an aspect of rationalization which survives undisturbed. 
Then, the strength of the Weberian categories consists not only in their heuristic productivity in a 
profoundly changed world, but also in their complex relationship. This feature indicates that the game 
is never definitively over; that the dialectic of means and ends remains open to swerves, inversions 
and surprises, and that a reason still hostage of dominative dreams can be turned to different 
directions. 
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Notes 
1
 For example in the essay on the avalutativity of the social sciences (Weber, 1949a). 
2
 For example in the conference on science as a profession (Weber, 1946b). 
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3
 On a comparable line, Owen e Strong (2004: xlii) talk of an ‘existential linkage’, rather than theoretical reconciliation, 
between the two ethics. Also Gane (1997) talks of a ‘practical reconciliation’ between the two ethics, though, as we 
have seen, he believes this happens in the framework of Zweckrationalität. 
4
 And the Marxist as well (Werskey, 2007). 
5
 Think of major R&D programs, such as the European Horizon 2020, and, within this, of funding lines like the 
Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI), where pharmaceutical companies define the topics of the calls for project 
proposals. 
6
 Note, however, that there is a thin line between, and often a mixture of, other-worldly and this-worldly concerns. This 
results not only from Weber’s discussion of asceticism and mysticism, but from analysis of current suicide terrorism. 
The usual claim is that suicide terrorists are motivated by hope in other-worldly rewards (perhaps mixed with rational 
choice considerations: high respect within one’s community, or contempt in case of retreat). However, investigation 
shows that a crucial motivating factor resides in a sense of injustice, humiliation and political subservience, against 
which the need is felt to react (Atran, 2003). Yet, what type of reaction? If power differentials with the adversary 
hamper the planning of actions in a means-ends rational way, suicidal attacks may make value-rational sense. They 
offer a testimony to the other-worldly ordering and may contribute, through (humanly) obscure pathways, to the 
rectification of wrong and the worldwide affirmation of Islam. 
7
 Is one leaving in this way the terrain of ethics, entering that of psychology? To answer one should have clear 
distinctive criteria, which to my knowledge no ethicist or psychologist possesses, and which one can hardly find in 
Weber, given his account of the problem of Theodicy as based on the lived experience of evil and injustice. 
8
 For Weber one has inevitably to select among available data according to research orientations, subsequently 
investigating the relevance of each chosen element. See the methodological essays of 1904 and 1906 (Weber, 1949b; 
1949c). An outcome of this standpoint is the caution Weber applies in interpreting past events and observed trends, for 
example in The Protestant Ethic (Weber, 2001) and Bourgeois Democracy in Russia (Weber, 1995).  
9
 Countless trials on industrial accidents and ‘side effects’ focus on ascertaining whether the management had taken 
safety measures commensurate to the scientific knowledge available at the time of the events in question, on the basis 
that nothing more could be asked them (Jasanoff, 1997). 
10
 Jonas focuses on threats related to increasingly powerful technologies, to address which, he claims, consideration for 
foreseeable effects is not sufficient. Nothing prevents from applying precaution in addressing natural hazards, such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes and epidemics.  
11
 One may object that this applies also to traditional hybridization techniques. However, these techniques rely on the 
compatibility of entire organisms, as they result from long evolutionary processes and ecological interactions, which 
vastly reduce the eventuality of (bad) ‘surprises’. 
12
 Thinking how, to address stagnation, unemployment and worsening living conditions, governmental elites stick with 
policies that have proven ineffective (and are arguably at the origin of the problems themselves), in the persuasion that 
sooner or later these will fulfil their promise of growth and well-being, one might say politics today is by and large 
driven by an ethic of ultimate ends. In this regard, the difference between liberalism and neoliberalism is important. 
Liberals seek to regulate less, to avoid that particular values interfere with market exchange, as the spontaneous meeting 
of individuals provided with own goals and motivations. Neoliberals seek to regulate the conditions for market 
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exchange, beginning with people’s self-understanding as entrepreneurs of themselves, in order to maximise 
competition, which is assumed to be the engine of the individual and collective good (Dardot and Laval, 2017).  
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